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Bewerbung für das Masterseminar im SoSe 2023 bis zum 24. Februar 2023
Die Bewerbung für das Masterseminar im kommenden SoSe 2023 ist bis zum 24. Februar (12 Uhr) geöffnet.
Bewerbung für das Mastermodul Problemlösung und Kommunikation (PUK) im SoSe 2023 bis zum 24. Februar 2023
Die Bewerbung für das Mastermodul Problemlösung und Kommunikation (PUK) im kommenden SoSe 2023 ist bis zum 24. Februar (12 Uhr) geöffnet.
Bewerbung für Abschlussarbeiten bis zum 15. Februar 2023
Die neuen Themenvorschläge für Bachelor- und Masterarbeiten sind nun veröffentlicht.
Employee stock ownership and firm exit decisions: A cross-country analysis of rank-and-file employees (2022)
While multinational firms invest large amounts of money in employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to reduce turnover, there is little evidence regarding ESOPs' effectiveness in retaining rank-and-file employees and none on a global scale.Building on psychological ownership (PO) arguments, we predict that a rank-and-file employee's ESOP participation will be negatively associated with a firm exit decision and that this effect will be stronger in contextual settings that are more conducive to turnover
Board experience and value creation in cross-border acquisitions: The role of acquirer and target country institutions, International Business Review (2022)
Our study investigates the effects of board acquisition experience on value creation in cross-border acquisitions and the dependence of this relationship on acquirer and target country institutions. We draw on cross-border acquisition research and institution-based corporate governance research to argue that the effect of board acquisition experience depends on the institutional characteristics of the acquirer and target countries and on cultural differences between these two countries
Determinants of common ownership: Exploring an information-based and a competition-based perspective in a global context, Journal of Business Research (2022)
In our new study, we explore the determinants of the widespread phenomenon of common ownership (i.e., one investor owning shares in at least two rival firms). We draw on two explanatory perspectives. In line with an information-based perspective, we argue that common ownership is more pronounced in contexts where investors can specifically benefit from their superior access to private information. In line with a competition-based perspective, we theorize that common ownership could be used by investors as a tool to silently engage in anti-competitive behavior. The results support our arguments.